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1. GENERAL AIMS OF THE STUDY 
In 1996, when the study was planned, the overall aim of the study was to investigate 
how cognitive processing of emotionally valenced information may be a vulnerability 
factor to depression. To do so, we decided to compare previously depressed 
individuals with clinically depressed individuals and non-depressed controls on 
several cognitive functions including preference for information, visual attention, 
reaction time, free recall and recognition. 
In the course of the study several factors have influenced how we have chosen to 
analyse and interpret the data. First of all, the data collection was comprehensive and 
lasted for several years. In the meantime the research literature on cognitive 
vulnerability factors to depression were considerably increased, especially with regard 
to the question whether a depressive episode by itself may function as a vulnerability 
factor. Also, there was a new tendency in the field to integrate different cognitive 
approaches to depression, including self-regulation theories and meta-cognitive 
perspectives. Finally, the quantity of collected data was great and this gave us the 
opportunity to generate and explore new hypotheses, and to develop a theoretical 
model to explain recurrent depression. 
Accordingly, in the course of the study the general aim of the study changed from a 
more general approach to the question of cognitive vulnerability factors in depression, 
to a larger focus on how depression may act as a vulnerability factor by itself. With 
this alteration of the focus, the main aim of the study has been to review the research 
literature and to integrate different cognitive theories to explain how cognitive 
processes may contribute to recurrent episodes of depression. Results from the present 
study have contributed to the development of the Cognitive battle model of recurrent 
depression presented in paper 1.  
Also, a general aim of the study has been to increase the knowledge of how self-
regulation, such as approach motivation, may influence cognitive processes and be 
related to cognitive vulnerability factors such as dysfunctional attitudes (paper 2). 
Finally, we wanted to increase our understanding of how automatic and effortful 
processes, respectively, are involved in the processing of emotionally valenced 
information (paper 3). Findings from previous research on cognitive processes in 




Introduction  3 
2. INTRODUCTION 
“That’s the thing I want to make clear about depression: It’s got nothing at all to do 
with life. In the course of life, there is sadness and pain and sorrow, all of which, in 
their right time and season, are normal - unpleasant, but normal. Depression is in an 
altogether different zone because it involves a complete absence: absence of affect, 
absence of feeling, absence of response, absence of interest. The pain you feel in the 
course of a major clinical depression is an attempt on nature’s part (nature, after all, 
abhors a vacuum) to feel up the empty space. But for all intents and purposes, the 
deeply depressed are just the walking, waking dead. 
And the scariest part is that if you ask anyone in the throes of depression how he got 
there, to pin down the turning point, he’ll never know. There is the classic moment in 
The Sun Also Rises when someone ask Mike Campbell how he went bankrupt, and all 
he can say in response is, “Gradually and then suddenly.” When someone asks how I 
lost my mind, that is all I can say too.”  
Elizabeth Wurtzel, 1994 (p. 22) 
2.1 Background 
As early as 1975, Seligmann described major depression as the “common cold” of 
psychiatry. Today, thirty years later, the situation has become even worse. Depression 
is currently affecting about 121 million people worldwide (World Health 
Organization; WHO, 2001a), and the incidence of depressive symptoms increases in 
all groups of age and in all western cultures (Klerman et al., 1985; Klerman & 
Weissman, 1992; Sartorius, Jablensky, Gulbinat, & Ernberg, 1980). According to the 
WHO (2001b) depression is today the leading cause of disability. Also, the WHO 
predicts that, of all diseases, in 2020 depression will impose the second-largest burden 
of ill health worldwide (Murray & Lopez, 1998).  
In a relatively recent epidemiological study from six European countries it was found 
that about 17 % of the population reported some experience with depression in the last 
six months, whereas major depression accounted for 7 % (Lepine, Gastpar, 
Mendelwicz, & Tylee, 1997). These findings are comparable to rates reported in 
Canadian (Parikh, Wasylenki, Goering, & Wong, 1996) and U.S. (Weissman, Bruce, 
& Leaf, 1990) samples, as well as in a Norwegian sample (Kringlen, Torgersen, & 
Cramer, 2001). In the U.S. population, at any one time, 10% had experienced clinical 
depression in the past year, and between 20-25% of the women and 7-12% of the men 
would suffer a clinical depression during their lifetime. In the Norwegian study it was 
found that at any one time 3-5% of the population are experiencing a clinical 
depression, and that during their life time, 24% of the women and 10% of the men 
have experienced a major depression (Kringlen et al., 2001).  
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In the broadest sense, the term depression includes a number of meanings from the 
description of everyday moods of feeling down or blue, to the description of serious 
depression with psychotic symptoms and increased risk of suicide. Depression 
includes emotional (e.g. depressed mood), motivational (e.g. loss of interest or 
pleasure), cognitive (e.g. negative thoughts, feelings of hopelessness), and somatic 
(e.g. loss of energy, sleep disturbances) symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980). Almost everybody will experience some of these symptoms in more or less 
degree. This is just as normal as experiencing happiness, interest and motivation, and 
thinking good about oneself and the future. However, when the symptoms have just 
been too many, too intense and are lasting too long in such a way that it interfere with 
social life, studies and working life, the depression is described as a clinical 
depression or a major depression, i.e., a depression that requires treatment.  
In depression research, an important question concerns whether a clinical depression is 
a qualitatively different experience from the experience of just feeling down for some 
days. In other words, is there also a qualitative threshold or are there just quantitative 
differences in symptoms, which distinguish these two conditions? The answer to this 
question has important implications for how clinical depression is defined and studied, 
i.e., as a cut-off point on self-rating scales or in accordance with categorical diagnostic 
criteria as outlined by diagnostic systems such as the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-10; World Health Organization, 1992) and the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
1980).  
An important difference between diagnostic systems and self-rating scales is how 
diagnostic systems emphasize the duration of depressive symptoms (i.e., at least two 
weeks) in addition to the amount, and intensity of symptoms. Also, the clinical 
diagnoses are made by interviews and not by questionnaires. Such differences between 
the diagnostic criteria for a clinical depression and cut-off points on self-rating scales 
may possibly grasp the qualitative difference between the experience of a clinical 
depressive episode compared to passing high depression scores on a self-rating scale. 
While much of previous depression research have relied on depression defined 
according to high scores on self-rating scales, the “gold standard” for defining 
population for study has now been clinical depression as defined according to 
diagnostic criteria (Gotlib & Hammen, 2002). 
The DSM-IV distinguishes between different diagnostic categories and divides mood 
disorders into two main categories, which include depressive disorders (major 
depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, depressive disorder NOS) and bipolar 
disorders (bipolar I, bipolar 2, cyclothymic disorder, bipolar disorder NOS). Also, the 
disorders may be specified according to the severity of the last episode, the recurrence 
of episodes and to whether the disorder has become chronic. More recently, however, 
researchers have argued that major depression may not be an episodic, but a chronic 
disorder in the sense of long-term vulnerability (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). 
The reason is that at least 50% of patients who recover from an initial episode of 
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depression will have at least one subsequent depressive episode (Paykel, et al., 1995). 
Moreover, patients with two or more past episodes will have a 70-80% likelihood of 
recurrence in their lives (Consensus Development Panel, 1985). 
The findings that the risk of getting new depressive episodes increases with number of 
previous episodes, also question whether the additional numbers of recurrent episodes 
is a vulnerability factor for experiencing new episodes (Coyne, Flynn, & Pepper, 
1999; Solomon et al., 2000). Furthermore, while the first depressive episode seems to 
be associated with negative life events, this association does not seem to be as strong 
for the recurrent episodes of depression (Zuckerman, 1999). Accordingly, it is nearby 
to conclude that depressive episodes by itself may act as a vulnerability factor. The 
important question to ask, then, is why? An answer to this question is essential when 
planning clinical interventions to prevent relapse and recurrence in depression. 
Obviously, preventing relapse and recurrence in depression will have the potential to 
reverse the trends of depression as the leading cause of disability in the world. 
2.2 Cognitive vulnerability to depression 
The first cognitive approaches to depression developed in the late 1960s and the early 
1970s. The new approaches were inspired from the rise of information-processing 
approaches in psychology, especially from the study of social cognition (e.g. Nissbett 
& Ross, 1980), and by Lazarus’ research (1966), which demonstrated that specific 
contents of thoughts (e.g. threat and danger) mediated emotional reactions (e.g. 
anxiety). Also, it was particularly appealing for investigators on depression that 
cognitive models were testable, which had not been the case for the psychoanalytic 
approach to depression. A common feature of the cognitive approaches was the 
emphasis placed on cognitive processes in etiology, maintenance, and treatment of 
depression (Abramson et al., 2002).  
Aaron Beck’s (1967) theory of negative automatic thoughts as triggers of depressive 
symptoms and Martin Seligman’s (1975) theory of learned helplessness and 
depression were two of the first cognitive models of depression. Both of them have 
strongly influenced the cognitive approach. During the last decades, however, several 
cognitive theories have been developed and partly in competition with each other. 
Today, however, there is a tendency present to integrate the different models in the 
sense that they cover different aspects of the cognitive approach. For example, 
Ingram, Miranda and Segal (1998) distinguish between cognitive models that focus on 
cognitive structures, cognitive operations, and cognitive products. Also, researchers 
have tried to understand how cognitive aspects of depression may be understood in a 
self-regulatory and psychobiological context (Abramson et al., 2002), in relation to 
frontal brain asymmetry (Tomarken & Keener, 1998), and in an interpersonal context 
(Joiner & Coyne, 1999). 
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2.2.1 Vulnerability and the diathesis-stress relationship 
People are vulnerable to the extent that they are susceptible to being hurt or wounded. 
In psychological domains this may imply an increased susceptibility to emotional pain 
and the occurrence of psychopathology of some type (Ingram et al., 1998). 
Vulnerability can consist of both inherited (e.g. genetic, family history of 
psychopathology, temperament, personality) and acquired (e.g. trauma, family 
experiences, peer interactions, other life events) factors (Zubin & Spring, 1977). 
However, whether a social experience will become a vulnerability factor will often 
depend on the interaction between inherited factors and social events. 
Several researchers distinguish between trait and state variables (Hollon, Evans, & 
DeRubeis, 1990; Hollon & Cobb, 1993). Whereas vulnerability is mostly regarded as 
an enduring trait, which predisposes individuals to a disorder, but do not initiate the 
disorder per se, the state variables represent the occurrence of the symptoms that 
reflect the onset of the disorder. The stability of trait variables may differ according to 
the genetic component making some trait variables very stable and almost permanent 
(e.g. bipolar disorder), whereas other trait variables are more easily changed through 
correcting learning experiences. A trait may be either strengthened or weakened 
through new experiences (Ingram et al., 1998). 
Vulnerability predisposes individuals to a disorder, but do not initiate the disorder. 
The diathesis-stress relationship explains how latent vulnerability becomes activated 
through events perceived as stressful by the individual. The diathesis refers to the 
predisposition to illness, whereas stress refers to the individual’s subjective perception 
of an event as stressful.  
Whether an individual experiences an event as stressful depends on the individual’s 
previous experience with similar events, which in turn have contributed to the 
vulnerability. Accordingly, as Ingram et al. (1998) state: “psychopathology is thus the 
interactive effect of the diatheses and events perceived as stressful (p. 78)”. 
2.2.2 How to study cognitive vulnerability? 
Ingram and Siegle (2002) distinguish between distal and proximal vulnerability 
factors. While developmental antecedents (e.g. negative self-schemata) are defined as 
distal vulnerability factors, proximal vulnerability factors may be cognitive 
dispositions (e.g. negative automatic thoughts), which are the result of the distal 
vulnerability, but which appear just before the onset of the depressive episode. 
Different research designs are available depending on whether the focus of research is 
on distal or proximal vulnerability factors. Methodological strategies in the study of 
distal vulnerability include high-risk research and longitudinal designs which try to 
decide whether factors in childhood determine depressive disorder later in life. In the 
study of proximal vulnerability, research has made use of cross-sectional, remission, 
and priming designs.  
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The focus of the present study is on proximal vulnerability factors and the design of 
the study is a cross-sectional remission design. Accordingly, the literature review 
below will also be limited to proximal factors. The intent of most remission studies is 
to examine the stability of potentially, causative factors, i.e., cognitive vulnerability 
traits. The assumption is that such traits should be stable, and if so, empirically 
detectable. However, and as discussed above, in the last decade, investigators on 
depression have been increasingly aware that a depressive episode, by itself, may be a 
vulnerability factor to recurrent episodes. Accordingly, by examining previously 
depressed individuals it may be difficult to distinguish between vulnerability factors 
that may be the consequence of having experienced a previous depressive episode, and 
vulnerability factors that contributed to the first depressive episode. 
2.3 Negative self-schemata and negative knowledge structures 
Beck’s (1967, 1976) cognitive theory of depression suggests that individuals who have 
experienced loss or adversity in childhood will develop negative self-schemata. 
Negative self-schemata are thought to be relatively stable across time, situations, and 
mood-states but also to be relatively dormant and inaccessible during non-depressive 
states. Clark and Beck (1999) suggest that negative self-schemata can be activated by 
a wide range of negative and stressful life events or situations, but especially by stress 
which reminds the individual of the experience when the negative self-schemata was 
established. When activated, negative self-schemata tend to generate negative 
automatic thoughts and to negatively bias the individual’s self-referent information 
processing. This will in turn trigger depressive symptoms. Also, Beck (1976, 1987) 
assumed that negative self-schemata contain dysfunctional attitudes concerning loss, 
failure and abandonment. Dysfunctional attitudes include beliefs such as one’s 
happiness depends on being perfect, being in control, or on other people’s approval 
(Beck, Hallon, Young, Bedrosian, & Budenz, 1985). When activated, dysfunctional 
attitudes will negatively influence the individual’s coping style and automatic 
compensatory strategies.  
Beck’s cognitive theory is a model that places the key emphasis on putative 
depressogenetic cognitive structures. Also, incorporated in Beck’s model is other 
cognitive elements such as thoughts and cognitions and various cognitive processes, 
but this is not the central organizing principle of this approach (Ingram et el., 1998). 
However, cognitive structures can only be tested through the content or the processes 
they generate. Numerous of studies have reported that currently depressed individuals 
report more evidence of dysfunctional cognitive structures, than those who are not 
currently depressed (Clark & Beck, 1999).  
2.3.1 The processing of emotionally valenced information in currently 
depressed individuals 
Early studies examining postulates and hypothesis derived from cognitive theories 
relied in large part on self-report methodologies to assess the negativity of the content 
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of the cognitive structure of depressive individuals. From this research there is a large 
literature showing that depressed individuals have significantly higher levels of self-
reported dysfunctional attitudes and negative automatic thoughts, more negative 
attribution style, and more negative autobiographical memories (Clark & Beck, 1999; 
Gotlib & Abramson, 1999; Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998; Gotlib, Kurtzman, & 
Blehar, 1997). 
More recently, investigators have employed experimental methodologies to assess 
cognitive processes in depression such as attention, encoding, retrieval, and 
interpretation of emotionally valenced information. An advantage with these 
methodologies, as opposed to self-report methodology, is that they allow the 
assessment of more automatic, as opposed to strategic and controlled functioning 
(Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000). This is important because the cognitive structure models 
of depression emphasize that negative self-schemata (Beck, 1967, 1976) and 
associative networks (e.g. Bower, 1981, 1987; Teasdale, 1988) are activated 
automatically and outside awareness.  
There has been extensive research on cognitive processes in depression, which have 
generated enormous amount of data, especially on selective attention and memory. 
Although much of the research support the hypothesis derived from cognitive theories 
that currently depressed individuals, compared to non-depressed controls, are 
negatively biased in information processing, there are also discrepancies across studies 
(for a review; Clark & Beck, 1999; Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000). One of the 
discrepancies has been whether depressed individuals process information in a 
negatively biased direction or if they have just “lost” the positivity bias, or the 
‘illusory optimism’, which has been found to characterize non-depressed individuals 
(for a review on this area, see Alloy & Abramson, 1988). Several explanations of the 
discrepant findings have been suggested, including the relevance of the stimuli to the 
concerns of depressed individuals, the method of the study, the co-occurrence of 
anxiety symptoms, the severity of the depressive symptoms, and whether the different 
cognitive processes are differently affected by negative self-schemata and negative 
knowledge structures (Clark & Beck, 1999; Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000). 
With regard to cognitive processes, two research groups have reviewed the research 
literature and have come up with different conclusions (i.e., Clark & Beck, 1999; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). The difference may be related to how 
the research groups have defined cognitive processes according to the continuum of 
automatic to effortful processing. For example, Clark and Beck (1999) argue that 
cognitive processes seldom are purely automatic, or purely strategic, and that it may 
be better to consider them in terms of the defining characteristics of automatic and 
strategic processing. For example, according to schemata theory of depression it is 
reasonable to assume that cognitive processes involving more integrative and 
elaborative processes will be more affected by negative self-schemata than earlier 
perceptually based processes. However, the earlier, more perceptually-based processes 
may also be more affected by negative self-schemata because they are more automatic 
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according to the defining characteristics of automatic/strategic processes (Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Hartlage et al., 1993; Williams et al., 1997). Furthermore, Clark and 
Beck (1999) argue that in depression positive self-schemata have low resting 
activation levels, requiring effortful processing to reach threshold. Because research 
has shown that depression interferes with effortful processing, but not with automatic 
processing (Hartlage et al., 1993), Clark and Beck (1999) suggest that depression 
would be characterized by enhanced automatic processing of negative self-referent 
information, but decreased effortful processing of positive stimuli. 
Also, Williams et al. (1997) conclude that emotional disorders may affect different 
aspects of cognitive processing and distinguish between two main processes that 
operate upon mental representation, priming and elaboration. In contrast to Clark and 
Beck (1999) they argue that depression is primarily characterized by a bias in 
elaboration, i.e., in the strategic and conceptually based memorial processing of 
negative self-referent information. A negativity bias in priming, which they describe 
as an automatic and selective perceptual encoding of information, they conclude is 
present in anxiety, but not in depression. Their argument is based on empirical 
findings and on theoretical viewpoints. For example, to avoid threatening stimuli, 
anxious individuals need to be alert to negative information and this will negatively 
bias priming processes, but not elaboration processes. Depressed individuals, on the 
other hand, have no need to be especially attentive to negative stimuli, accordingly no 
bias in priming processes will occur. However, after this first stage of passive intake 
of partial information from the environment (i.e., priming), the information is mapped 
on to internal representations or schemata. These schemata will then accommodate the 
information and direct further processing resources during the next intake cycle 
towards the most salient stimulus. For individuals with negative self-schemata, this 
will be negative self-referent information. Accordingly, Williams et al. (1997) suggest 
that depression affects the active strategic element of memory retrieval, enhancing the 
recall of negative material.  
2.3.2 Studies supporting depressogenetic cognitive structures in previously 
depressed individuals 
Along with the research on cognitive processes in currently depressed individuals, 
there has also been an extensive examination of individuals supposed to be cognitively 
vulnerable to depression (Clark & Beck, 1999; Ingram et al., 1998). However, a 
serious problem with Beck’s theory is that depressogenetic cognitive structures have 
shown to be less detectable when the depressive episode remits, indicating that 
dysfunctional structures may rather be a state than a trait characteristic.  
According to Beck’s theory of latent negative self-schemata, these findings are not 
very surprising. The problem has been to find an adequate priming procedure that is 
able to activate the depressogenetic cognitive structures. Because negative self-
schemata are thought to be established as a result of personally experienced negative 
events, experiences that may vary greatly from person to person, it has been a major 
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methodological problem to find relevant primers to activate negative self-schemata 
(Clark & Beck, 1999).  
The help came from an information processing approach to depression, also with the 
focus on cognitive structures. In 1981 Bower developed a model of mood and memory 
and argued that associative networks are developed between mood nodules and 
memory nodules. As a result, mood can precipitate changes in thinking and changes in 
thinking can precipitate changes in mood (Ingram et al., 1998). Based on Bower’s 
model of mood and memory, Ingram (1984) and Teasdale (1988) have, independently 
of each other, developed two similar information-processing models of depression. 
Generally, a common focus of these two models is that vulnerability is conceptualised 
as the availability of cognitive networks, or structures, that are associated with 
affective structures of sadness. A consequence of these models is the suggestion that 
dysphoric mood may be involved in the activation of negative thinking. 
This mood-state hypothesis of the activation of negative thinking has been tested in 
several studies. For example, Miranda, Gross, Persons, and Hahn (1998) 
experimentally induced dysphoric mood in their subjects and found that previously 
depressed individuals who reported increased negative mood also reported increased 
dysfunctional attitudes, whereas less vulnerable individuals who reported increased 
negative mood, reported decreased dysfunctional attitudes. Other studies have found a 
positive correlation between dysphoric mood and dysfunctional thinking in previously 
depressed individuals, but not in individuals who had never been depressed (Miranda 
& Persons, 1988; Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990; Roberts & Kassel, 1996). 
Central to the mood-state hypothesis is the suggestion that dysphoric mood work as a 
primer of depressogenetic cognitive structures. Hartlage et al. (1993) argue, however, 
that dysphoric mood contributes to depression by decreasing the effortful processing 
of information making the more automatic processing of well-learned negative 
thinking in cognitively vulnerable individuals more accessible. Accordingly, 
dysphoric mood may be involved either as a primer or by decreasing effortful 
information processing. And, as discussed above, according to Clark and Beck (1999), 
decreased effortful processing will also involve decreased processing of positive 
information in addition to increased processing of negative self-referent information. 
2.4 Self-regulation, coping strategies and meta-cognition  
Another explanation of what may regulate negative thinking in vulnerable individuals 
come from cognitive models which focus more on cognitive operations (Ingram et al., 
1998) or the way people deal with dysphoric mood or negative situations (Segal et al., 
2002). For example, from an extensive research on mental control in depression, 
Wenzlaff and colleagues argue that previously depressed individuals are characterized 
by actively suppressing dysfunctional thinking in an attempt to ward off the depressive 
thoughts that threaten their emotional well-being. Wenzlaff, Rude, and West (2002) 
argue that the mood-state hypothesis (Miranda & Persons, 1988) is vague concerning 
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how dysfunctional attitudes become dormant and it seems that the prevailing 
explanation is that “when external circumstances improve, negative cognitions ebb 
and eventually become dormant, thereby facilitating a return to a normal state (p. 
535)”. As an alternative explanation, Wenzlaff and colleagues suggest thought 
suppression. However, thought suppression will have the ironic consequence of 
triggering the automatic processing system to be especially alert on the negative 
information to be suppressed. Consequently, when effortful processing is decreased by 
dysphoric mood, the ability to suppress dysfunctional thinking will decrease and the 
ironic processing of negative stimuli will dominate the individuals information-
processing (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
Wenzlaff et al. (2002) suggest that formerly depressed individuals in an attempt to 
maintain their emotional well-being are cognitively characterized by continuously 
suppressing dysfunctional thinking. Self-regulation theories of depression are, 
however, emphasizing more what happens to cognitively vulnerable individuals when 
confronted with a stressful situation. In those theories, a negative event, or an 
experience of “discrepancy” in a situation, initiates a shift in attention to evaluate the 
current situation (Gray, 1994; Higgins, 1987; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). This 
shift in attention begins with attention directed internally to focus on the self (Carver 
& Scheier, 1998), which allows individuals to compare their current state with their 
desired state and to initiate behaviour to reduce the discrepancy. Such a shift in 
attention is generally an adaptive response because people switch their attention to the 
problem in an attempt to resolve it (Abramson et al., 2002). In other words, this is a 
normal, healthy coping strategy. However, while less vulnerable individuals are able 
to disengage from this self-focused attention, cognitively vulnerable individuals seem 
to become stuck in this checking process. For example, holding the dysfunctional 
attitudes of rigid and perfectionist standards may both make it more difficult to solve 
problems, and to adjust one’s goals in the face of thorny problems. 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) describes the cognitive condition of being stuck in a 
checking process as depressive rumination. According to Nolen-Hoeksema, 
rumination is the cause of why individuals who maintain depressive mood states differ 
from individuals who are able to cope effectively with passing dysphoric mood. More 
recently, depressive rumination has been understood from a meta-cognitive 
perspective (Segal et al., 2002; Wells, 2000). Papageorgiou and Wells (2001) argue 
that individuals who are cognitively vulnerable to depression both held positive and 
negative beliefs about rumination. Positive beliefs reflect themes concerning 
rumination as a coping strategy and motivate individuals to engage in sustained 
rumination (i.e., “I need to think about things in this way to find answers to my 
depression and reduce my distress”). However, thinking about negative aspects of the 
self or the negative situation rather serves to perpetuate than to resolve the negative 
feelings (Segal et al., 2002). As a consequence, negative beliefs about rumination will 
arise and be reflected in themes concerning the uncontrollability and the harm of 
rumination, and its interpersonal and social consequences. Papageorgiou and Wells 
(2003) suggest that it is especially the activation of negative beliefs that contributes to 
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the experience of depression. Accordingly, Papageorgiou and Wells argue that 
rumination is a coping strategy, which ultimately backfires.  
Self-regulation may also be understood in a psychobiological perspective. Gray (1994) 
has proposed two systems that are critical in the regulation of behaviour: The 
Behavioural Approach System (BAS) and the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS). 
While the BAS is sensitive to signals of reward, non-punishment, and escape from 
punishment; the BIS is sensitive to signals of punishment and non-reward (e.g. 
failure). While the activation of BAS causes the person to begin movement toward 
goals, the activation of BIS inhibits behaviour that may lead to negative or painful 
outcomes. Signals activating BIS or BAS can either be external events or internal 
cognitions. While BAS is assumed to be associated with positive emotions such as 
hope, elation, and happiness, BIS is assumed to be associated with negative affect and 
anxiety (Carver & White, 1994).  
From the self-regulation perspective, it is the BIS that will be activated when the 
individual experience a negative event or a “discrepancy” in the situation. When less 
vulnerable individuals are able to disengage from the self-focused attention and 
resume goal-seeking activity, this will probably be reflected in a deactivation of BIS 
and a reactivation of BAS. In cognitively vulnerable individuals, however, who are 
not able to disengage from the ruminative checking, one may expect a large-scale 
deactivation of BAS, which may, if strong enough result in a depressive episode 
(Abramson et al., 2002). 
Crowe and Higgins (1997) distinguish between promotion and prevention strategies 
for self-regulation and suggest that people differ in degree to whether they are 
prevention or promotion focused. Promotion focus, or nurturance-related regulation, is 
concerned with ideals, advancement, aspiration, and accomplishment, whereas 
prevention focus, or security-related regulation, is concerned with oughts, protection, 
safety and responsibility. Also, recent personality research has found that people may 
differ with respect to approach or avoidance focus in the conceptualisation of personal 
goals (Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997). Having negative 
self-schemata containing dysfunctional attitudes may possibly contribute to such 
differences between people. For example, Abramson et al. (2002) argue that 
individuals characterized by a combination of perfectionism and high self-efficacy 
may show relatively high approach motivation. On the other hand, individuals with a 
combination of perfectionism and low self-efficacy may probably show a relatively 
high prevention motivation. Accordingly, high levels of dysfunctional attitudes may 
possibly be associated with a prevention or avoidance focus. 
The suggestion that activated negative self-schemata will negatively bias the 
information processing in depression is central to Beck’s cognitive theory of 
depression. However, and as discussed above, Clark and Beck (1999) also assume that 
decreased effortful processing, as a result of dysphoric mood, will involve decreased 
processing of positive stimuli. This assumption is in line with self-regulation theory 
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that suggests that confronted with a negative event or discrepant situation, cognitively 
vulnerable individuals may exhibit decreased approach motivation to positive 
information. Also one may assume that along with the deactivation of BAS, 
vulnerable individuals will move from having a positivity bias in their information 
processing, to be fifty-fifty, to finally be negatively biased in self-referent information 
processing. This viewpoint may resemble that of other researchers who have 
suggested that it may be the equality between positive and negative thoughts that puts 
people at risk for depression (Ingram & Smith, 1984; Kendall & Hollon, 1981). Also, 
it resembles that of the self-regulation perspective of depression, which holds that the 
core problem in depression may be the regulation between BIS and BAS. 
2.5 A depressive episode as a vulnerability factor for 
depression  
As discussed above, research has found that the risk of getting another depressive 
episode increases with number of previous episodes (Consensus Development Panel, 
1985). Furthermore, while the first depressive episode is associated with negative life 
events, this association is not that strong for recurrent depression (Post, 1992; 
Zuckerman, 1999), indicating that the depressive episode by itself has been a 
vulnerability factor (Coyne, et al., 1999; Solomon et al., 2000). Several researchers 
have tried to explain why this is the case. 
From a neurobiological perspective, Post (1992; Post & Weiss, 1995), has proposed a 
kindling-sensitization model which suggests that with each episode of depression, the 
neurotransmitter systems become more easily dysregulated. While a strong stressor is 
needed for the dysregulation initiating the first episode, only mild stressors are 
required for the subsequent episodes. This neurobiological model is in accordance 
with the cognitive information processing models (Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1988). For 
example, Ingram et al. (1998) suggest that because the depressive knowledge 
structures, for each depressive episodes, are deployed in a growing number of 
contexts, this will lead to a situation where even small changes in mood would be 
sufficient to activate them. Consequently, Ingram et al. (1998) conclude that the 
relapse and recurrence of depressive episodes can be viewed as the “retriggering” of 
the patterns of biological and information-processing activity that characterize the 
initial episode.  
Also, Segal et al. (2002) emphasize how small changes in mood are sufficient to 
activate depressive knowledge patterns, but they also recognize how the tendency in 
cognitively vulnerable individuals to ruminate about the easily accessible negative 
material, actually worsen the situation. It seems obvious that ruminating about the 
negative material only will strengthen the depressive knowledge pattern. While the 
biological and information processing models, and also the rumination model as 
outlined by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991), emphasize the relatively passive contribution of 
the cognitively vulnerable individual, Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) more strongly 
emphasize how the individual, by the use of dysfunctional coping strategies, actively 
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contributes to the escalation process of dysphoric mood into depressive relapse or 
recurrence. For, as discussed above, according to Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) 
rumination is a coping strategy, which ultimately backfires. Also, Wenzlaff et al. 
(2002) are more emphasizing how mental control strategies, such as suppression (the 
ironic processing hypothesis), actively contribute to the escalation process. 
Interestingly then, two qualitatively different coping strategies, i.e., suppression and 
rumination, are suggested to be responsible for the escalation process of dysphoric 
mood to clinical depression. 
Central to theories of depression is the assumption that previous life events, primarily 
experienced in childhood, make individuals vulnerable to depression (i.e., distal 
vulnerability factors). One of their common features is how they emphasize the class 
of experiences, which are associated with the loss of emotional care, social 
reinforcement, self-worth, and feelings of control (for a review; Gotlib & Hammen, 
2002). For example, Martin Seligman’s (1975) theory of learned helplessness and 
depression, which later was reformulated to the theory of learned hopelessness 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), was developed from research which had 
shown the deleterious effects of uncontrollable aversive events.  
It is striking, however, how little attention that has actually been paid to the fact that a 
clinical depressive episode by itself may be experienced as a highly uncontrollable and 
traumatic life event. In the clinic, it is quite common that clients express such 
experiences with their depressive episode. In the research on cognitive vulnerability 
factors to depression, this approach has been almost absent. Certainly, several 
researchers have discussed how the depressive condition may result in social rejection 
and lowered self-worth and thereby reinforce the depressive symptoms (for a review; 
Joiner & Coyne, 1999). However, limited attention has been devoted to increase our 
understanding of how previously depressed individuals react and cope when faced 
with a situation that reminds them of a previous depressive episode. For example, do 
they feel anxious of again loosing control, i.e., turning into a new depressive episode? 
And do they try to cope with such a situation by avoiding and suppressing negative 
thinking and dysphoric symptoms? Or are they continuously suppressing depressive 
thinking in an effort to maintain emotional well-being as Wenzlaff and colleagues 
have suggested? 
The present study has placed these questions regarding the mechanisms of recurrent 
depression on the agenda and has gathered some data, which may support a Cognitive 
battle model of recurrent depression. Also, the present study has investigated whether 
decreased approach motivation may be a vulnerability factor to depression, and how 
automatic and effortful processes are involved in the processing of emotionally 
valenced information. 
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3. SPECIFIC AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The general aims of the study have been to: (1) develop a cognitive model of recurrent 
depression; (2) investigate whether decreased approach motivation may be a 
vulnerability factor to depression; and, to (3) investigate how automatic and effortful 
processes are involved in the processing of emotionally valenced information in 
depression.  
In addition to the general aims of the study, there were several more specific aims: 
• To examine how dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms are related 
to each other in each group of participants, respectively (paper 1).  
• To examine how dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms are related 
to the cognitive processing of emotionally valenced information in two 
different information processing tasks, including listening preferences for 
tape-recorded self-statements and choice preferences in a visual attention task 
(paper 1, paper 2). 
• To examine how increased reaction time in a visual attention task may be a 
state-independent measure of decreased approach motivation in individuals 
cognitively vulnerable to depression (paper 2). 
• To examine how dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms are related 
to reaction time to positively and negatively valenced words in a visual 
attention task (paper 2).  
• To examine how dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric mood are related to 
automatic and effortful processing of positive and negative self-statements 
(paper 3). 
• To examine how automatic and effortful processing are related either to an 







4.1 Participants  
The study included 149 participants who were either clinically depressed, had 
experienced a depressive episode in the past, or had never been clinically depressed. 
All the participants took part in the whole procedure of the study. Accordingly, the 
participants are the same in all three papers. Demographic and clinical characteristics 
of subjects are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Demographic and Clinical Characteristics of Subjects 
 Clinically 
depressed 
(n = 61) 
Previously 
depressed 
(n = 42) 
Never  
depressed 
(n = 46) 




36/25 17/25 18/28 
Sex (f/m) 
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The participants were recruited from two different populations, i.e., undergraduate 
students at the University of Tromsø, and patients consulting their general practitioner, 
also in Tromsø. The decision to recruit subjects from these two populations was three-
folded: Firstly, because we wanted to include in the study both clinically, previously 
and never depressed individuals, we had to find populations were it would be possible 
to get this three categories of individuals. Furthermore, the decision to recruit 
participants from two different outpatient populations was pure practical, i.e., in a 
limited period of time we needed a large number of participants to get enough subjects 
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to each group. Finally, we decided to include only clinically depressed individuals 
who were outpatients, i.e., not hospitalised. This decision was both practically and 
theoretically founded.  
The study was designed with a procedure of about six hours administrated on two 
different days of testing. We thought that it would be difficult to motivate more 
severely depressed individuals to take part in a study in an order of that size. From a 
more theoretical point of view, however, it would be especially interesting to examine 
individuals with less severe depressive symptoms, but who were still diagnosed with a 
clinical diagnostic interview. After a review of previous research on depression, we 
found that such a sample of outpatient-depressed individuals was relatively rare in the 
literature. Research had either focused on students with depressive symptoms as 
measured with different self-rating scales, but who were not clinically diagnosed, or 
on clinically diagnosed inpatients with more severe depressive symptoms and often on 
medication.  
4.2 Procedures 
In an initial screening procedure a questionnaire including items about current (Beck 
Depression Inventory: BDI1; Beck Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and previous 
depression (Previous Depression Questionnaire: PDQ; Wang, 1996) was administered 
to approximately 800 undergraduate students and to approximately 600 patients 
consulting their general practitioner. From the sample of individuals who returned the 
questionnaire by mail, subjects were invited to participate if their answers to the 
questionnaire indicated that they were: (1) clinically depressed; (2) were not clinically 
depressed but had experienced a previous depression; or (3) were neither clinically 
depressed nor had ever experienced a depressive episode (cf. paper 1). The invitation 
to participate in the study was made by telephone and an appointment for the first of 
two testing days was made. However, all the potential participants were informed 
about a second screening, i.e., initially they knew that some of the participants would 
finish after a clinical interview and some would continue the study. 
4.2.1 The first day of testing 
Before the second screening procedure, all participants answered the Depression 
Adjective Check List (DACL1; Lubin, 1965) and then completed the BDI2. Based on 
information from the clinical diagnostic interview (Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV, Axis I disorders; SCID-CV; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997), 
several individuals were excluded from the study because they either failed to meet 
the full criteria for a current or a previous depression, and for some other reasons (cf. 
paper 1). Accordingly, the final group assignment was made according to the clinical 
interview and not according to self-reported symptoms on a self-rating scale. The 
group-classification reliability was tested and a highly satisfactory reliability was 
found (cf. paper 1). 
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For the individuals who did not meet the requirements, the participation in the study 
was finished after the SCID-interview. The remaining others continued the procedure 
of the first day by answering several questionnaires (those with reference, not reported 
on in the present papers) and doing one experimental task in the following order: the 
Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991), the Unrealistic Optimism Scale (Weinstein, 1980), 
the DACL2, the Crowson’s Auditory Forced Choice Device, the Tonal Quality 
(Crowson & Cromwell, 1995), the DACL3, the Post-Experimental Questionnaire, 
measures of free recall and recognition, and finally the DACL4. 
4.2.2 The second day of testing 
Like the first day of testing, the procedure of the second day included several 
questionnaires and an experimental task (those with reference, not reported on in the 
present papers), and the participants were tested in the following order: BDI3, the Ivac 
Core Check (Tympanic Thermometer System, Model 2090), the Deployment of 
Attention Task, the California Verbal Learning Test (Delis et al., 1987), the 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), the Schema Questionnaire (Young, 1990), and 




The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1979) was included in the study to 
measure the severity of depressive symptoms on the two separate days of testing 
(BDI2 & BDI3), and to select potentially participants to the study (BDI1). BDI-scores 
are classified as follows: normal range, 0-9; mild-moderate depression, 10-18; 
moderate-severe depression, 19-29; and serious depression, 30-63 (Beck & Steer 
1987). The means and standard deviations for each group are presented in Table 1. 
The Previous Depression Questionnaire (PDQ; Wang, 1996) was developed to, in the 
initial screening, identify currently nondepressed individuals who had previously been 
depressed and to identify individuals who had never experienced a depressive episode. 
The PDQ was constructed using DSM-IV criteria for a past major depressive episode. 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, Axis I disorders (SCID; First et al., 
1997) is a semi-structured interview administered individually by a trained 
interviewer. It is designed to identify diagnosis as outlined in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Axis I disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). 
The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (Form A)(DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978) was 
included in the study to measure the presence of dysfunctional attitudes that may 
relate to cognitive vulnerability to depression (Oliver & Baumgart, 1985). The content 
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of items concerns the need for approval, dependency, perfectionism performance 
standards, and rigid ideas about the world. Scores on the DAS can range from 40 to 
280, with higher scores indicating more dysfunctional attitudes. Scores above 125 are 
considered as high. The means and standard deviations for each group are presented in 
Table 1. 
The Depression Adjective Check List (Form E)(DACL; Lubin, 1965) was included in 
the study to measure rapid mood changes during the first day of testing. Especially we 
wanted to test whether the listening preference task, described below, had any impact 
on mood. 
The Post-Experimental Questionnaire (PEQ; Crowson & Cromwell, 1995) was 
included to the study to assess the participants’ impressions after the listening 
preference task.  
Recognition was measured with a questionnaire to measure recognition of self-
statements from the listening preference task (Wang & Holte, 1995), whereas free 
recall and fabrication were measured with an empty page with an instruction to write 
all the sentences and phrases the participants could remember from the task. 
4.3.2 Apparatuses and materials 
The Crowson’s Auditory Forced Choice Device (Crowson & Cromwell, 1995) is 
equipment designed to measure listening preferences for positive and negative tape-
recorded self-statements where the dependent variable is total listening time to each 
tape. The negative self-statements characterize depressive self-talk (Holon & Kendall, 
1980), whereas the positive self-statements characterize positive self-talk among 
depressed as well as non-depressed individuals (Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988). 
The Deployment of Attention Task (Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988; Kakolewski, 
Crowson, Sewell, & Cromwell, 1999; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995) is a task designed to 
measure visual attention where the dependent variables are choice and reaction time. 
The stimulus material consists of positive, negative and neutral words. 
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5. SUMMARY OF PAPERS 
Paper I 
Wang, C. E., Brennen, T., & Holte, A. (2005). Mechanisms of recurrent 
depression: A cognitive battle model and some preliminary results. Clinical 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 12, 427- 442. 
Theoretical models of cognitive mechanisms assumed to be involved in recurrent 
depression are discussed and a cognitive battle process between compensatory coping 
strategies and the automatic processing of negative information is suggested. 
Preliminary support for the model comes from a study that investigated preferences 
for positive and negative tape-recorded self-statements in clinically depressed (CD), 
previously depressed (PD), and never depressed individuals (ND). The results showed: 
1) A positive correlation between dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms in 
CDs and PDs, but not in NDs; 2) NDs preferred positive self-statements, whereas CDs 
preferred neither positive nor negative self-statements; 3) PDs exhibited different 
patterns of preference depending on the levels of dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric 
symptoms. For example, simultaneous high levels of both dysfunctional attitudes and 
dysphoric symptoms in PDs resulted in a preference for positive self-statements. This 
finding is discussed as a possible compensatory strategy of avoiding negative 
information in PDs. Clinical implications for treatment and prevention of depression 
are discussed.   
Paper II 
Wang, C. E., Brennen, T., & Holte, A. (2005). Decreased approach motivation 
in depression. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, in press. 
The present study examined relations between choice preference and reaction time to 
emotionally valenced words, dysphoric symptoms (BDI), and dysfunctional attitudes 
(DAS) in clinically depressed (CD; n = 61), previously depressed (PD; n = 42), and 
never depressed controls (ND; n = 46). The results showed: 1) NDs and PDs exhibited 
a choice preference for the relatively more positive words and differed significantly 
from CDs; 2) PDs and CDs exhibited longer reaction time and differed significantly 
from NDs; and 3) BDI and DAS were positively associated with reaction time to 
positively valenced words, whereas no associations were found for reaction time to 
negatively valenced words. The increased reaction time, in PDs and CDs, is discussed 
as a possible vulnerability factor to depression, which may be related to decreased 
approach motivation.   
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Paper III 
Wang, C. E., Brennen, T., & Holte, A. (2006). Automatic and effortful 
processing of self-statements in depression. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 35, 
117-124. 
Clark and Beck (1999) and Williams et al. (1997) have come up with quite different 
conclusions regarding which cognitive processes are most affected by negative self-
schemata and negative knowledge structures. In order to increase the understanding of 
differences in effortful and automatic processing in depression, we compared never 
depressed (ND), previously depressed (PD) and clinically depressed (CD) individuals 
on free recall, recognition and fabrication of positive and negative self-statements. The 
results showed that: 1) overall NDs and PDs recalled more positive self-statements 
than CDs, whereas CDs correctly recognized more negative self-statements than NDs 
and PDs; and, 2) CDs and PDs fabricated more negative than positive self-statements, 
whereas no difference was obtained for NDs. The results seem to be in line with Clark 
and Beck’s suggestions. However, there are several aspects of the present findings that 
make the picture more complicated. 
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6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1 Summary of results 
A Cognitive Battle Model 
The main result of the present study is the development of a Cognitive battle model to 
explain mechanisms involved in recurrent depression (paper 1; figure 1). The model 
proposes an escalation process of dysphoric mood to clinical depression where 
compensatory coping strategies, such as avoidance and suppression, may be 
responsible for a “cognitive decomposition” with an increased risk for a new episode 
of clinical depression. The model emphasizes that suppression and avoidance are 
coping strategies which are situation-released to cope with the anxiety of again loosing 
control, i.e., turning into a new depressive episode. This model contrasts Wenzlaff and 
Wegner’s model  (2000), which propose that previously depressed individuals are 
continuously suppressing dysfunctional thinking in order to maintain their emotional 
well-being.  Also, the model explains how it may be possible that two qualitatively 
different coping strategies, such as suppression and rumination, may be present at the 
same time, i.e., we suggest that anxiety of again loosing control will trigger self-
instructions such as: “I must not think about it” or “I have to keep on going”. 
Accordingly, our suggestion is that such self-instructions are “rumination of the 
necessity of avoiding negative self-referent information”. 
In order to examine how formerly depressed individuals would react and cope when 
presented with information that remind them of a previous depressive episode, we 
gave the participants the opportunity to choose to listen to either positive or negative 
self-statements. We found a listening pattern among previously depressed individuals 
that was different from the rest of the findings (see below) and which may support a 
possible compensatory strategy of avoiding negative information, i.e., simultaneously 
high levels of both dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms resulted in a 
preference for positive self-statements. Also, findings from self-reported preferences 
for positive and negative self-statements, and mood changes during the procedure, 
gave preliminary support for the Cognitive battle model of recurrent depression. 
Decreased approach motivation 
Another main result of the present study was the finding of increased reaction time to 
visually presented emotionally valenced words in both previously depressed and in 
clinically depressed individuals. Also we found that dysphoric symptoms and 
dysfunctional attitudes were positively associated with reaction time to positively 
valenced words, whereas no associations were found for reaction time to negatively 
valenced words. These findings were interpreted as decreased approach motivation in 
previously depressed and in clinically depressed individuals, indicating that this may 
be a vulnerability trait to depression. However, in choice preference, previously 
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depressed and non-depressed controls exhibited a positivity bias whereas the clinically 
depressed individuals chose about fifty-fifty, indicating that this may be a state 
variable that reflects the onset of the clinical depression.  
Automatic and effortful processing  
The final aim of the study was to increase our understanding of how automatic and 
effortful processes are involved in the processing of emotionally valenced 
information. To do so, we compared the three groups on three different memory 
processes assumed to be more or less automatic or effortful. For methodological 
reasons, these findings are difficult to interpret. In conclusion, however, we found 
support for the suggestion that in depression one would find decreased effortful 
processing of positive self-referent information as suggested by Clark and Beck 
(1999), but no bias in the more automatic processing of emotionally valenced 
information as suggested by Williams et al. (1997). Also, we found that clinically 
depressed and previously depressed individuals fabricated more negative self-
statements than positive self-statements, indicating that this may be a vulnerability 
trait to depression.  
The main findings in each group of participants   
In the group of non-depressed controls we found a positivity bias both in choice 
preference for visually presented emotionally valenced words, and in preference for 
tape-recorded self-statements. We did not find any association between dysphoric 
symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes, indicating that mood and attitudes do not have 
any impact on each other in individuals who are not cognitively vulnerable to 
depression. These findings are in line with previous research (Miranda & Persons, 
1988; Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990; Roberts & Kassel, 1996). 
Also, in the group of previously depressed individuals we found a positivity bias in 
choice preference for visually presented emotionally valenced words. However, in 
preference for tape-recorded self-statements high levels of dysfunctional attitudes in 
combination with different levels of dysphoric symptoms lead to different cognitive 
processing of self-statements: While high levels of dysfunctional attitudes alone 
decreased the preference for positive self-statements, simultaneously high levels of 
dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms increased the preference for positive 
self-statements. Finally, we found a positive association between dysfunctional 
attitudes and dysphoric symptoms, decreased approach motivation to emotionally 
valenced words, and more fabrication of negative self-statements compared to positive 
self-statements.  
In the group of clinically depressed individuals we found an equal processing of 
positive and negative information in choice preference to visually presented 
emotionally valenced words, and in preference to tape-recorded self-statements, which 
may indicate that these variables are state-dependent measures of depression. 
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However, and similar to the previously depressed group, we found a positive 
association between dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms, decreased 
approach motivation to emotionally valenced words, and more fabrication of negative 
self-statements compared to positive self-statements. Accordingly, this may indicate 
that these variables are trait-measures of vulnerability to depression.  
6.1.1 Dysphoric symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes as vulnerability 
factors to depression 
The participants in the present study may possibly differ from cognitively vulnerable 
individuals who have participated in previous research on depression. Firstly, we 
defined depression in terms of clinical diagnoses as provided by a structural interview 
(i.e., SCID) and not according to a cut-off point on a self-rating scale (e.g. BDI). As 
discussed in the introduction section, it may be important qualitative differences 
between subjects who have been defined as depressed according to self-rating scales, 
and subjects who have been defined as depressed by a diagnostic interview. Secondly, 
even if the depressed individuals in the present study were depressed according to 
clinical diagnosis, they were outpatients and thus possibly not as severely depressed as 
in many other studies. Accordingly, a sample of diagnosed clinically depressed 
outpatients is rare in the research literature and our findings on cognitive deviations in 
this group may be valuable to increase our understanding of how mild-moderate major 
depression may escalate in to a more serious depression.  
Furthermore, by defining depression in terms of clinical diagnoses, it is possible that 
we have grasped some specific characteristics of formerly depressed individuals, 
which may have been lost in previous research. For example, in our study we found 
that previously depressed individuals had relatively high degree of dysphoric 
symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes. This contrasts with previous studies, which 
have found that dysfunctional attitudes do not persist beyond recovery from the 
depressive state (Clark & Beck, 1999; Ingram et al., 1998). However, these studies 
have only included previously depressed individuals with a depression score within 
the normal range as measured with self-rating scales. A problem with defining 
previous depression by this criterion is, however, that if dysfunctional attitudes persist 
in vulnerable individuals, but are inaccessible until they have become activated by 
negative mood, then it will be impossible to detect this association. Also, if previously 
depressed individuals generally exhibit higher levels of dysphoric symptoms and 
dysfunctional attitudes than what is normal, this may be a vulnerability factor to 
depression that has been previously overlooked.  
Consequently, our findings of a positive association between dysphoric symptoms and 
dysfunctional attitudes in clinically depressed and in previously depressed individuals, 
but not in non-depressed controls, may indicate that mood and cognition are largely, 
functionally separate and hence may reflect a causal relationship in depression. The 
findings are consistent with previous research (Miranda & Persons; 1988; Miranda et 
al., 1990; Roberts & Kassel, 1996). To summarize, dysfunctional attitudes may be a 
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vulnerability factor to depression, which may be activated by dysphoric mood. 
Compared to less vulnerable individuals, previously depressed individuals may 
generally be more dysphoric and exhibit higher levels of dysfunctional attitudes, 
making them more vulnerable to recurrent episodes of depression. 
6.1.2 The relationship between dysfunctional attitudes and the cognitive 
processing of positive and negative information 
Central to cognitive structure models of depression are the suggestion that activated 
negative self-schemata, or negative knowledge structures, will bias the information 
processing negatively. However, although much research has supported this 
suggestion, there are also findings, which indicate that the main problem in depression 
is the loss of positivity bias. Results from the present study seem to support this latter 
suggestion. By looking more thoroughly at the methods we have used, the cognitive 
processes we have studied, and the characteristics of the participants, we suggest that 
the loss the positivity bias is the consequence of high levels of dysfunctional attitudes. 
This is an interesting hypothesis because dysfunctional attitudes have usually been 
assumed to negatively bias the individual’s information processing (Beck, 1967, 
1976). The loss of positivity bias, we suggest, will in turn contribute to the escalation 
process of dysphoric mood into a clinical depression.  
For example, in the listening preference task we found in the clinically depressed 
group a negative correlation between listening time to positive self-statements and 
dysfunctional attitudes. Because the previously depressed and the never depressed 
group were positively biased, whereas the clinically depressed group was not, this may 
indicate that dysfunctional attitudes in the clinically depressed group decreased the 
positivity bias which was present in the other two groups. In the previously depressed 
group there was different patterns of listening preferences depending on the levels of 
dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms (see above). These findings indicate 
that also in the previously depressed group, dysfunctional attitudes decreased the 
listening preferences to positive self-statements when the previously depressed were 
only mildly dysphoric. In the Cognitive battle model, however, we actually argue that 
increased processing of negative self-referent information (in this case because of 
decreased processing of positive information), in turn will be responsible for the use of 
coping strategies to avoid negative self-referent information. Accordingly, the 
positivity bias found in previously depressed individuals might actually be an 
avoidance reaction.  
In choice preference to visually presented emotionally valenced words, we found for 
the whole sample, a negative correlation between choice preference to positive words 
and dysfunctional attitudes. Also in choice preference, we found that the previously 
depressed and the never depressed group were positively biased, whereas the clinically 
depressed group was not. Accordingly, also in this visual attention task it seems that 
dysfunctional attitudes were responsible for decreasing the positivity bias. However, it 
is striking that the previously depressed individuals who, compared to the never 
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depressed individuals, exhibited more dysfunctional attitudes and more dysphoric 
symptoms, still were positively biased in choice preference. A possible explanation 
may be that there exists a “threshold” where the positivity bias disappears. This 
explanation may be supported by the findings that it was only in the clinically 
depressed group that dysphoric symptoms were negatively correlated with choice 
preference.  
To summarize, findings from both the listening preference task and the visual 
attention task seem to indicate that dysfunctional attitudes may impair the ability to 
attend to positive information and by this wipe out the ‘illusory optimism’ that often 
characterize non-depressed individuals. An exception from this is the positivity bias 
found in previously depressed individuals with simultaneously high levels of 
dysfunctional attitudes and dysphoric symptoms. However, and as discussed above, 
we suggest that this is not a genuine attraction to positive information, but rather an 
avoidance reaction to negative self-referent information. 
The strongest support for the suggestion that dysfunctional attitudes may decrease the 
processing of positive information seems to be the finding that dysfunctional attitudes, 
in the visual attention task, were related to increased reaction time to relatively more 
positive words whereas no relation was found between dysfunctional attitudes and the 
reaction time to relatively more negative words. In visual attention tasks, reaction time 
has usually been regarded as a measure of selective attention either to positively or to 
negatively valenced information. However, in the present study we argue that there is 
several reasons to claim that reaction time is better conceptualised as a measure of 
approach motivation.  For example, researchers have discussed whether the method 
used in the present study is a pure measure of visual attention or whether it implicitly 
encourage the use of guessing strategies in a discrepant situation. Also, we found that 
reaction time was unrelated to choice preference and to dysphoric symptoms. 
Accordingly, it is not reasonable to suggest that reaction time in the present study is a 
measure of selective attention, neither a measure of motoric retardation which often 
follows depressive symptoms.  
Finally, we found that dysfunctional attitudes were negatively related to free recall of 
positive self-statements and therefore may be involved in the decreased effortful 
processing of positive self-statements which was found in clinically depressed 
individuals. Interestingly, however, the difference obtained, was primarily in the effort 
to recall positive self-statements, i.e., it was only when a looser criterion of correct 
recall was used that the difference was present. Also, we found that the fabrication of 
more negative self-statements than positive self-statements in clinically depressed and 
previously depressed individuals, was obtained as a consequence of decreased 
fabrication of positive self-statements. Altogether, these findings may indicate that it 
was actually the ‘illusory optimism’, or the ‘self-enhancing illusion’, which was lost in 
the information processing of positive self-statements. These findings support Clark 
and Beck’s (1999) assumption that depression is characterized by decreased effortful 
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processing of positive stimuli. Also, the findings are in line with self-regulation 
theories of decreased approach motivation to positive stimuli. 
In the present study we used recognition as a measure of automatic processing and 
found that dysfunctional attitudes also were related to increased recognition of 
negative self-statements. However, we did not find increased recognition of negative 
self-statements in the clinically depressed individuals as suggested by Clark and Beck 
(1999). Possible explanations may be that recognition is not an appropriate measure of 
automatic processing and that the clinically depressed individuals in the present study 
were only mildly to moderately depressed. 
6.1.3 The escalation process of dysphoric mood to a clinical depression; the 
consequence of an imbalance in positive and negative information 
processing?  
Why are dysfunctional attitudes capable of wiping out the ‘illusory optimism’, or 
decreasing the positivity bias, normally present in non-depressed individuals? Our 
suggestion is that dysfunctional attitudes, when activated will make the cognitively 
vulnerable individual more motivated to prevent unfortunate outcome rather than 
taking the risk of approaching new goals. For example, holding an attitude that: “If I 
fail partly, it is as bad as being a complete failure” (i.e., an item in DAS), will change 
the focus from the desired positive outcomes, to the possible negative outcomes of the 
situation, to be sure that it will not happen. However, by changing the focus to the 
possible negative outcomes, the approach motivation to positive stimuli will decrease 
and the processing of negative information will increase. Accordingly, when 
dysfunctional attitudes are activated, it seems likely that the first part of an escalation 
process of dysphoric mood in to a clinical depression may be the decreased approach 
motivation to positive stimuli, which in turn will increase the processing of negative 
self-referent information. This explanation is in line with the self-regulation 
perspective of depression suggesting that the core problem in depression may be the 
regulation between BIS and BAS (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1994). It also 
resembles the viewpoint of Ingram and Smith (1984), and Kendall and Hollon (1981), 
who suggest that it may be the equality between positive and negative thoughts that 
put people at risk for depression.  
In the present study, increased reaction time to positive stimuli was unrelated to choice 
preference. This may indicate that decreased approach motivation does not 
immediately decrease the processing of positive stimuli. However, one may argue that 
decreased approach motivation to positive stimuli is an expression of uncertainty, or 
ambivalence, about how to cope in a discrepant or stressful situation. Furthermore, we 
assume that it is actually this ambivalence that is the core problem in individuals who 
are cognitive vulnerable to depression. This ambivalence may be measured by 
increased self-focused attention (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) and rumination 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Papagerorgiou & Wells, 2003).  Accordingly, decreased 
approach motivation may be an important part of an escalation process of dysphoric 
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mood to a clinical depression. In such an escalation process we suggest that the 
balance between the processing of positive and negative information will be gradually 
displaced in the favour of the processing of negative information. And, when the 
processing of negative information becomes as strong as the processing of positive 
information, we suggest that the consequence will be a “cognitive decomposition” 
where the information processing will be predominantly negative.  
A cognitive decomposition may constitute the qualitative difference between just 
having incidentally high depression scores on a self-rating scale and the presence of a 
clinical depression. An experience of loosing control may be the expression of 
stepping over this threshold. Individuals who have experienced a clinical depression 
have described this threshold in the following way: “Gradually and then suddenly” 
(Wurtzel, 1994). And, also they have described the clinically depressive state as being 
a “walking, waking dead”, a different zone, which involves a complete absence, an 
absence of interest, response, feeling, and affect  (Solomon, 2001; Wurtzel, 1994). 
To summarize, by including previously depressed individuals with dysphoric 
symptoms, and clinically depressed individuals who were not hospitalised, the present 
study made it possible to collect data and generate hypotheses about possible 
vulnerability factors contributing to the escalation process of dysphoric mood into a 
clinical depression. By including more severe clinically depressed individuals, we 
might probably have uncovered the presence of a negativity bias in the processing of 
emotionally valenced information. 
6.2 Clinical implications and further research 
Clinical implications of the present study may be related to several findings. Firstly, if 
previously depressed individuals generally exhibit higher levels of dysphoric 
symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes than what is normal, it is reasonable to assume 
that these individuals will be more vulnerable to depression. Accordingly, an 
important goal for future research is to replicate our findings and to design treatments, 
which ensure that previously depressed individuals will get help in bringing down 
their dysphoric symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes. However, also the findings of 
higher levels of dysphoric symptoms in previously depressed individuals, question 
whether formerly depressed individuals have problems with their previous depressive 
experience (e.g. worrying about the risk of loosing control again, and feeling 
continuously stressed by trying to avoid such a risk). Results from a study using the 
Rorschach method seem to support these suggestions (Hartmann, Wang, Berg, & 
Sæther, 2003). The authors found a tendency in previously depressed individuals, as 
compared to never depressed individuals, towards increased levels of anxiety, low 
stress tolerance, low self-esteem, rigid and maladaptive coping strategies and feelings 
of hopelessness. Also, these findings are in line with research, which has found that 
people exposed to chronic stress may develop poorly regulated neuroendocrine 
systems. Researchers have argued that when these people later in life are exposed to 
even a minor stressor, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis overreacts, which in 
 
30 General discussion 
turn creates changes in the functioning of the monoamine neurotransmitters in the 
brain. This may possibly cause depressive episodes (Holsboer, 1992; Young & 
Korzun, 1998; Weiss, 1991). Accordingly, future research on cognitive processes in 
recurrent depression should include measures of neuroendocrine activity such as for 
example the hormone cortisol. 
The demonstration of increased levels of dysphoric symptoms and dysfunctional 
attitudes in previously depressed individuals, also has contributed to the development 
of the Cognitive battle model. As we have discussed above, dysphoric symptoms, 
dysfunctional attitudes and decreased information processing of positive stimuli, may 
remind the formerly depressed individual of the previous depressive episode and 
evoke anxiety of again losing control. This may in turn trigger the use of maladaptive 
coping such as avoidance and suppression. Accordingly, different relapse preventive 
treatment should be designed dependent of the dysphoric state of the previously 
depressed individual. For example, similarly to traditional cognitive therapy for 
depression (Beck, 1995), previously depressed individuals without dysphoric 
symptoms should learn to reduce their amount of dysfunctional attitudes, not to 
engage in sustained rumination and actively to select positive self-referent 
information. However, as dysphoric symptoms arise, it may be important not to avoid 
or suppress depressive cognitions, but rather to explore and reality tests them. Meta-
cognitive interventions may be important to bring to conscious how coping strategies 
intended to prevent depressive relapse, may actually have the opposite effect by 
increasing the possibility of experiencing a new depression episode.  
Finally, depending upon their affective and dysfunctional attitude profile, and their 
coping style, previously depressed individuals may be regarded as having experienced 
a “traumatic life event”, which has led to impairment of their information processing 
and thereby loss of control. Accordingly, our understanding of depressive patients 
may profit from knowledge accumulated from the treatment of posttraumatic stress 
disorder. A crucial point in relapse prevention of depression, then, could be, at the end 
of a depressive episode, to treat this experience as much as the treatment of the 
depressive symptoms and the presumed causal factors behind these depressive 
symptoms. This may be a focus of further research on prevention treatment for 
recurrent depression.  
6.3 Limitations of the study and methodological challenges  
The design of the present study was a cross-sectional remission design and the focus 
of the study was on proximal vulnerability factors. Accordingly, the present study was 
not designed to explain distal vulnerability factors such as childhood experiences. In 
the last decade, however, several researchers have actually made distal vulnerability 
factors the focus of their research. From longitudinal research, findings generally 
support the suggestion that interpersonal experiences in childhood influence the 
development of the child’s self-regulation and cognitive style (for a review; Goodman, 
2002). Also it has been found in infants of depressed mothers, atypical patterns of 
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frontal EEG asymmetry, i.e., reduced left frontal brain activity, which are associated 
with positive emotions of joy and interest (Davidson & Fox, 1982; Dawson et al., 
1999). This finding may indicate that there exist neurobiological correlates of reduced 
approach motivation in depression (Tomarken & Keener, 1998). Furthermore, high-
risk research has provided compelling support for the cognitive theories of depression 
(Abramson et al., 1999; Alloy, Abramson et al., 1999; Alloy et al., 1997).  
By having this more recent research on development antecedents as a backcloth for 
the present study, our focus was on cognitive vulnerability factors that may be caused 
by previous experiences, but which appear just before the onset of the depressive 
episode. Because of methodological limitations of the present study, there are 
potentially two main problems related to the interpretation of the results. Firstly, the 
intent of most remission studies has been to examine the stability of potentially, 
causative factors predicting first-episodes of depression. However, by being aware that 
the depressive episode by itself may act as a vulnerability factor, a core problem with 
the remission design is to distinguish between these two types of vulnerability. In the 
present study we have discussed vulnerability factors that may be primarily caused by 
development antecedents, (i.e., dysfunctional attitudes; decreased approach 
motivation), and vulnerability factors that may primarily be the consequence of the 
depressive experience (cf. the Cognitive battle model). However, due to the cross-
sectional research design, we cannot be absolutely certain about the origin of these 
proximal vulnerability factors. Furthermore, when interpreting the results from the 
present study, we chose to focus on possible escalation processes of dysphoric mood 
into a clinical depression. However, to obtain more conclusive results, it had been an 
advantage to use a longitudinal design to, after a mood induction procedure, follow the 
participants in the presumed escalation process. Of ethical reasons, of course, this 
opportunity is excluded. Accordingly, if one is just aware of the methodological 
limitations, cross-sectional designs may be useful to examine potentially escalation 
processes in depression. 
In the present study we have challenged some common understanding of what 
experimental methods are actually measuring. For example, in the Deployment of 
Attention Task (paper 2), we argued that the task is more like a guessing task in a 
discrepant situation, rather than a pure visual attention task, which the task has usually 
been regarded as (Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988; Kakolewski et al., 1999; McCabe 
& Gotlib, 1995). The findings on reaction time from the present study supported this 
suggestion. Also, we have discussed whether experimental set-ups with good internal 
validity are good models of real-world situations that confront us in daily life (paper 
3). Experimental methods to investigate cognitive processes in depression are of great 
value, but may be useless if the external or clinical validity is poor. For example, in 
research on memory processes in depression one should be aware that recall and 
recognition is functionally dependent of earlier stages of information processing 
including how people choose the information they will attend to. In fact, it is a crucial 
point in cognitive theory of depression, that vulnerable individuals select and interpret 
emotionally ambiguous information differently to non-vulnerable individuals. 
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Accordingly, if the present study in an effort to increase the internal validity had given 
the participants exactly the same amount of listening time to positive and negative 
self-statements, the finding may have been less useful in clinical purposes. 
Finally, there are several limitations with the Cognitive battle model and with the 
findings supporting this model (paper 1). Firstly, the model was primarily developed 
on the basis of reviewing theories and previous research on cognitive vulnerability to 
depression. By doing so, we were aware that little attention had been paid to the 
formerly depressed individuals experience of the depressive episode itself. 
Accordingly, the present study was carried out in order to explore and increase such 
knowledge. The findings gave some support to our model, but must of course be 
interpreted cautiously due to small sample sizes and marginally significant results. 
Also, each step of the model was not tested in the present study. Alternative 
interpretations of the findings may be present. However, the main intention with this 
article was not to strictly test the Cognitive battle model, but to contribute to generate 
a basis of hypotheses testing and clinical interventions. Future research will decide if 
the Cognitive battle model will increase our understanding and treatment of relapse 




The present study has developed a Cognitive battle model to explain possible 
mechanisms involved in recurrent depression. The model has several methodological 
limitations and there may be alternative interpretations of the findings that have been 
taken as support to the model. The model has, however, generated a basis of future 
hypothesis testing and clinical interventions.  
Also, the study has contributed with findings which suggest that previously depressed 
individuals, in general, may be more in psychological distress than the part of the 
population that have never experienced a clinical depression. More dysphoric 
symptoms in previously depressed individuals may be a vulnerability factor to 
recurrent depression and future research should be carried out to replicate this finding.  
Furthermore, findings from the study seem to indicate that dysfunctional attitudes, in 
mildly to moderately clinically depressed individuals, may have the potential to 
decrease the effortful processing of positive stimuli. Decreased processing of positive 
stimuli may result in an imbalance in the processing of positive and negative 
information, which possibly will contribute to an escalation process of dysphoric 
mood into a clinical depression.  
Finally, the present study has contributed with results, which indicate that decreased 
approach motivation to positive stimuli may be a vulnerability factor to depression. 
Future research should be aimed to examine the relationship between parenting (e.g. 
insecure attachment; inadequate affect regulation), frontal lobe development (i.e., 
hemispheric asymmetry), cognitive vulnerability factors (e.g. uncertainty; rumination), 
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